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The Status of Foreign Sovereigns
in Private Antitrust Actions
JOHN A. JOSTAD °

I. INTRODUCTION
No other country has embraced the capitalist free enterprise system
as wholeheartedly as has the United States, and no country has so successfully applied the concept that competitive buying and selling are the
most certain ways of ascertaining the true value of a product. Although
the influence of government is unavoidable, the present political attitude
is increasingly one of laissez-faire rather than one of governmental monitoring and control.
The capitalist system contains imperfections. A recurring problem is
the inability of the capitalist system to prevent the emergence of monopolistic or oligopolistic activity. Either of these developments undermines
an essential element of the capitalist system which is the existence of a
large number of sellers and a large number of buyers. To prevent the
total undermining of the system, antitrust laws, described as "The Magna
Carta of free enterprise"' and as "a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade,"'s have been enacted. Indeed, even the most fervent antigovernment economists recognize the need for antitrust law, and most businessmen in the United States understand the need for such laws as well.
Neither American antitrust law nor the philosophy of competition it
reflects has been fully accepted by other nations. In fact, much of the
world disagrees with this philosophy. Tying agreements, exclusive dealing
arrangements, price fixing, horizontal and vertical mergers, and cartels
abound in the international business world. Many of the practices are violative of American antitrust law but are perfectly legal in other nations
with less stringent antitrust laws. Indeed, such activities may be consistent with the basic economic philosophy of some foreign states. Any attempt by U.S. firms to employ any of these methods to offset the foreign
practices may render the U.S. firm susceptible to an attack by the Justice
Department or to suit in American courts by foreign sovereigns as private
plaintiffs seeking treble damages and costs.

*John A. Jostad is a J.D. candidate at the University of Denver College of Law. B.S.,
1977, Bemidji State University.

1. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
2. United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See also A.B.A. ANTrRUUI
LAw DEVELOPMENTS 1 (1975).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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This Comment investigates one narrow aspect of the "extraterritorial" application of American antitrust laws. By its terms, the Sherman
Act covers "[elvery contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce . . with foreign nations."' Any discussion of the
general development of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws is beyond the scope of this Comment. The concern herein surrounds
the status of a foreign nation under U.S. antitrust law. Although many of
the substantive developments in extraterritorial antitrust law are relevant, i.e. antitrust defenses, those aspects have been severely limited in
favor of procedural considerations.
Among the questions addressed in this Comment are the following:
What is the position of the courts respecting a sovereign's standing to sue
as a private plaintiff?. Will a foreign sovereign be recognized as a named
defendant? What are some of the international implications involved?
And what legislative steps are being considered to address the problems
that arise when a foreign state is involved in antitrust litigation? Finally,
because of the confusion exhibited by the courts in their use of certain
terms, a major focus of this Comment is upon the definitions of terms
used in the antitrust laws, as well as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA),5 and related areas of law. The intention of this investigation is to provide a greater understanding of the problem and to clarify the issues.

4. The Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976)). Until United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa),
all reported U.S. antitrust cases included American corporations as defendants and the acts
of restraint occurred in this country. However, in Alcoa, Judge Hand wrote:
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can
catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States. On the
other hand, it is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders ...
which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily
recognize.

Both agreements would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made
within the United States; and it follbws from what we have just said that both
were unlawful, though made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports
and did affect them. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 443-44.
In this case, antitrust law was extended, as a matter of judicial policy, to encompass wholly
foreign conduct if such conduct has effects within the United States. For examples of the
pre-Alcoa attitude, see United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); Thomsen v.
Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry.& Navigation Co., 228 U.S.
87 (1913); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See generally W.
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTrTRusT LAWS (2d ed. 1973).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
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II.

UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW-

A. The Statutes
A critical point of confusion in U.S. antitrust law surrounds the definition of a single word: "person." The Sherman and Clayton Acts both
rely upon the identical definition of the word, stated as follows: "The
word 'person' or 'persons' wherever used in this Act, shall be deemed to
include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the
laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the
laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country."
As used in U.S. antitrust law, no distinction is drawn between the use
of the word "person" in a defendant context and "person" when used to
describe a private plaintiff. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that:
"Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination
or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony . .

. .

.7Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:

Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ...
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee. 8
It appears that there is no distinction drawn in the use of the word "person" in either context. Viewing the single definition of the word, there
would seem to be no reason to expect variation in its use. Indeed, that
belief was echoed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cooper
Corp.:' "It is fair to assume that the term 'person,' in absence of an indication to the contrary, was employed by the Congress throughout the act
in the same, and not in different senses."' 0
Subsequent cases have not reflected this initial interpretation. Since
United States v. Cooper Corp., a decision in which the United States was
held not to be a person within the meaning of the Sherman Act," the
definition has become increasingly confused. Within the United States,
the variation in interpretation is easily recognized in application of the
antitrust laws to states. In Georgia v.Evans," Justice Frankfurter held
that Georgia was a "person" entitled to sue for treble damages and

6. The Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1914)(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 12

(1976)). The definition in the Sherman Act is the same. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
9. 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
10. Id. at 607.
11. United States v. Cooper Corp. involved an attempt by the United States to recover
treble damages in an antitrust action. The Clayton Act was amended in 1955 to specifically
allow the United States to "recover actual damages by it sustained and the cost of suit." 15
U.S.C. § 15(a)(1976).

12. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
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concluded:
If the State is not a 'person'..., the Sherman Law leaves it without

any redress for injuries resulting from practices outlawed by that
Act. . . Nothing in the Act, its history, or its policy, could justify so
restrictive a construction of the word 'person' in § 7 as to exclude a
State. 8

Then, in Parker v. Brown,'4 the Supreme Court did not allow a suit to
proceed against California's Director of Agriculture concerning the restraint upon the raisin industry of a raisin marketing program. A close
reading of the case reveals that the Court did not hold that the state was
not a "person, "' but based the decision upon concepts of immunity and
sovereign action. However, the absence of a specific statement that the
state was a person has led to a recognized definitional inconsistency. This
equivocation has influenced extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws.
The variation in interpretation clearly surfaces in two leading cases
involving foreign sovereigns. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India (Pfizer)," India, the Imperial Government of Iran, and the Republic of the
Philippines brought a private claim for treble damages against six pharmaceutical manufacturing companies.17 In deciding whether a foreign nation is entitled to sue in our courts for treble damages under the antitrust
laws, the Court stated:
[A) foreign nation otherwise entitled to sue in our courts" is entitled
13. Id. at 162.
14. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
15. The Court stated in this regard:
The Act is applicable to 'persons' including corporations. . . and it authorizes
suita under it by persons and corporations ...
.A state may maintain a suit
for damages under it.. . but the United States may not.. . - [these are]
conclusions derived not from the literal meaning of the words 'person' and
'corporation' but from the purpose, the subject matter, the context and the
legislative history of the statute. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 351. See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
16. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
17. Similar actions were also brought by Spain, South Korea, West Germany, Columbia, Kuwait, and the Republic of Vietnam.
18. Beginning with its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized that foreign
sovereigns are permitted to sue in U.S. courts subject to certain well-defined exceptions. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1871); The Santissima
Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822).
There are two major exceptions when foreign sovereigns cannot sue in U.S. courts: (1)
when they are nations at war with the United States, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), and (2) when they are not recognized by the executive branch. The latter exception was applied specifically when Vietnam's complaint against
Pfizer, Inc., was dismissed in the case of Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc.; 556 F.2d 892
(8th Cir. 1977). The court recognized that the Republic of Vietnam had "ceased to exist in
law or in fact as a state and as a government" since the United States recognized no govern-
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to sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws to the same extent
as any other plaintiff. Neither the fact that the respondents are foreign nor the fact that they are sovereign is reason to deny them the
remedy of treble damages Congress afforded to 'any person' victimized by violations of the antitrust laws."'

A strong Burger dissent called for a congressional remedy to this situation. The Chief Justice pointed out that the use of the word "person"
referred to both plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust statutes and that
Congress did not specifically recognize foreign sovereigns within that
definition.20

In InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. OPEC," a federal district court concluded that the "statutory language does not support the
conclusion that foreign sovereigns are persons subject to Sherman Act liability."" The court distinguished the Pfizer holding as follows:
The determining factor by the [Supreme] Court was that it did not
'require the Judiciary in any way to interfere in sensitive matters of
foreign policy.':

.

. To include foreign nations within the ambit of

'persons' who may be sued as defendants, however, would require judicial interference in sensitive foreign policy matters ....3
Therefore, a foreign nation may sue, but not be sued, under the
United States antitrust laws" and perforce, the Court is compelled
ment in the territory formerly known as South Vietnam. Id. at 893.

This decision focused upon what is loosely referred to as the principle of comity. The
Supreme Court has defined comity as follows:

This Court has called 'comity' in the legal sense 'neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other.'. . . Although comity is often associated with the existence of friendly
relations between states ....
the privilege of suit has been denied only to
governments at war with the United States... or to those not recognized by
this country ....
This Court would hardly be competent to undertake assessments of varying degrees of friendliness or its absence, and, lacking some definite touchstone
for determination, we are constrained to consider any relationship, short of
war, with a recognized sovereign power as embracing the privilege of resorting
to United States courts. (Citations omitted).
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 409-10.
19. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. at 320.
20. Id. at 322.
21. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
22. Id. at 570. This action involved a claim by the plaintiff union against OPEC and the
member nations for alleged price fixing of crude oil prices. Therefore section 1 of the Sherman Act was allegedly violated.
23. In a footnote the court states:
Giving a foreign sovereign the option to sue, merely allows the nation to use
our judicial system if it wishes. Allowing foreign sovereigns to be sued, how-

ever, would require their presence in our courts. Thus the latter poses the
greater threat to sensitive matters of foreign policy.
Id. at 572 n.18.
24. In another footnote, the court states: "This determination is consistent with the
Court's rulings concerning domestic States under the antitrust laws. States may sue, Geor-
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here to dismiss the entire action against the defendants, members of
OPEC because they cannot be made defendants herein in this antitrust suit ....
(Citations omitted.)
*"

With this statement, the inconsistency was formally recognized.
Since this is a lower court opinion, it could be maintained that this inconsistent interpretation is not established law. However, it seems to be an
extension of the way in which states are treated under the antitrust laws.
As will be recognized, this tenuous distinction in the interpretation of the
word "person" was and is not required to keep the foreign sovereign from
defending its actions in U.S. courts. Confusion of the issues has resulted
in inconsistency, and apprehension of an unacceptable or unenforceable
result has impeded logical assessment and basic statutory interpretation.
B. Judicial Interpretationsof the Antitrust Laws
The sovereign defendant has available a variety of defenses under
U.S. antitrust law. There are also problems of standing and damages for
all private plaintiffs, including foreign sovereigns. While a complete investigation in this regard is beyond the scope of this Comment, some of the
actual antitrust problems other than inconsistent statutory interpretation
should be examined.
With the increasing prevalence in the international arena of statecontrolled corporations, the importance of the act of state doctrine in potential antitrust actions has been enhanced. The concept may be defined
as follows: "[A] court in the United States, having jurisdiction . . . will

refrain from examining the validity of an act of a foreign state by which
that state has exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to its public interests."' This is a statement of the more general policy recognized in Underhill v. Hernandez. 7 In that case Chief Justice Fuller stated:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every

other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government done within its own territory.

Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.'8

An example of the application of the act of state doctrine is found in
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co."e In this case, a disgia v. Euans ... but not be sued, Parker v. Brown ... under the antitrust laws. Id. at 572
n.19.
25. 477 F. Supp. at 572.
26. RESTATEMsNT (SECOND) FOIGN RzLATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 (1965).
27. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
28. Id. at 252. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964);
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
29. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), afl'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
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pute arose between two American oil companies which held offshore oil
concessions granted respectively by two adjacent sheikdoms in the
Trucial States in the Persian Gulf. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
induced the ruler of one sheikdom, Sharjah, to claim ownership of the
best part of the area of the plaintiffs' concession so that defendants could
eventually obtain rights to drill in this area. Relying upon the act of state
doctrine, the court stated:
[T]o establish their claim as pleaded plaintiffs must prove, inter alia,
that Sharjah issued a fraudulent territorial waters decree, and that
Iran laid claim to the island of Abu Musa at the behest of the defendants. Plaintiffs say they stand ready to prove the former allegation
by use of 'internal documents.' But such inquiries by this court into
the authenticity and motivation of the acts of foreign sovereigns
would be the very sources of diplomatic friction and complication that
the act of state doctrine aims to avert."0
One can easily recognize the relevance of this statement to the role of a
foreign sovereign as a named defendant, since in this case these states
were recognized as unindicted co-conspirators. Any finding for the plaintiff would have severely challenged the activities of the sovereigns
involved.81
Another closely related defense that is limited to a private defendant
is the foreign compulsion principle. As presented by Justice Holmes in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,"' this rule would prevent antitrust liability for acts of private parties done pursuant to foreign law or at
the direction of a foreign government. Although broader, the concept is
closely related to the act of state doctrine, and the overlap was succinctly
recognized in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texas Maracaibo, Inc.:83
"When a nation compels a trade practice, firms have no choice but to
obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign." 8 '
The reach of these two concepts is still unclear despite much litigation. In the case of the foreign compulsion principle, a private party must
show that the act was compelled and not merely condoned, allowed or
30. 331 F. Supp. at 110.
31. It is important to distinguish between the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity, which will be discussed in greater detail below. An immunity defense bars consideration of the merits of the claim, including an examination of the act which gave rise to the
claim. Therefore, if immunity is found, the defense that the act is not subject to examination by reason of the act of state doctrine will not be reached. The act of state defense
applies when a person is acting on behalf of the foreign state and immunity applies to the
foreign state itself. However, many of the definitional problems, as well as exceptions to the
two provisions, are virtually identical in theory and scope. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41, Comment e (1965); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 438.
32. 213 U.S. at 357-58. See W. Fugate, supra note 4, at 82.
33. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
34. Id. at 1298. See Vogelenzang, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion in American Antitrust Law, 33 STAN. L. Rv. 131 (1980).
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legal. Application of this concept becomes difficult if the private plaintiff
has lobbied the foreign state into "compelling" the private actions.'5 Also,
it seems that purely "commercial activity" is not protected by either the

act of state doctrine or sovereign compulsion. 6 Although the role of commercial activities will be discussed in detail in relation to the FSIA, the
act of state and foreign compulsion defenses possibly cannot be invoked if
commercial activity of the sovereign is involved. Finally, it must be
remembered that these defenses apply only to activity that has taken
place within the foreign state and not to foreign activities within the
United States itself.

Any antitrust case, be it extraterritorial or not, may fail because of
the application of recognized policies of antitrust law in the United
States. The Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,3 rejected the "passing on" defense, a defense based on the
presumption that a direct purchaser was not an injured party entitled to
bring a private claim since the overcharges are passed on in the form of
higher prices. Then, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,ss a price-fixing case,
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may recover only if it purchased
directly from the alleged price fixer. Realizing a risk of multiple liability
for defendants if they could be sued by both direct and indirect purchasers, the Court stated:
[Wie understand Hanover Shoe as resting on the judgment that the
antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the
full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than
by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to
sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed by it."

This limitation to direct purchasers should be an effective defense when
35. The dispute in this area revolves around application of the Noerr doctrine which is
that "the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in
an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect
to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly." Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961). See also Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (1971). However, the Noerr doctrine was
distinguished in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962):
"Respondents were engaged in private commercial activity, no element of which involved
seeking to procure the passage or enforcement of laws." Id. at 707. See also Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J.
INT'L L. 100, 132 (1967).

36. In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698-99 (1976),
Justice White, joined only by three other justices in this plurality opinion, stated:
Repudiation of a commercial debt cannot, consistent with this restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, be treated as an act of state; for if it were, foreign governments, by merely repudiating the debt before or after its adjudication, would enjoy an immunity which our Government would not extend them
under prevailing sovereign immunity principles in this country.
37. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
38. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
39. Id. at 734-35.
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foreign sovereigns are named defendants since the private plaintiff is
often removed from any direct effects of the price-fixing actions by the
foreign government.' 0
1
If the Illinois Brick doctrine does not eliminate the plaintiff's case,
the plaintiff must then show injury to business or property "by reason of"
antitrust violations. Loosely recognized as a proximate cause requirement,
the plaintiff must establish: (1) that a violation of the antitrust laws has
in fact occurred; (2) that the illegal conduct was a substantial cause of the
injury; and (3) that the injury is measurable in dollars. 2 Again, where
governmental actions are involved, it may be difficult to prove that those
actions were the cause of the injury.'

I

Finally, efforts by states to claim damages as parens patriae under
section 4 of the Clayton Act, either on behalf of its individual citizen consumers" or for alleged injury to the state's economy as a whole,' 5 have
been uniformly unsuccessful. Whether this limitation applies to foreign
sovereigns has yet to be determined. However, apart from the antitrust

field, foreign sovereigns have generally been allowed to pursue claims 'on
behalf of their citizenry, acting 7as the guardian of citizen interests
abroad."6 Yet, the doubt remains.

40. See InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 561. This requirement that only "direct purchasers" have standing to sue has been challenged legislatively by
Senator Kennedy. He introduced the Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979, S. 300, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). This bill would have provided indirect purchasers the standing to sue for
damages. However, at the present time the passage of this bill in any form seems remote.
'See Road Looks Rough for Illinois Brick Bill, 65 A.B.A.J. 1783 (1979).
41. Even if it cannot be shown that the plaintiff is the direct purchaser, the plaintiff
may still maintain an action for injunctive relief. International Ass'n of Machinists v.
OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 561.
42. See A.B.A. ANTrrRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 258 and cases cited
therein.
43. See InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. at 573.
44. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1045 (1973), rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 1148 (1974); California v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 309 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Pa. 1969).
45. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). These actions can be distinguished
from those discussed earlier in which the state has sought to recover damages for injuries
resulting to it from violations of the antitrust laws. For instance, in Georgia v. Evans, 316
U.S. 159 (1942), Georgia sued on specific contracts for damages due to a price-fixing scheme.
No general damage to the state's economy was alleged.
46. For an excellent and definitive discussion of this problem of parens patriaeactions
by a foreign sovereign in an antitrust action, see Velvel, Antitrust Suits by ForeignNations,
25 CATH. U.L. REv. 1, 27-33 (1975). Professor Velvel has consistently argued that a foreign
nation should be permitted to sue as the official representative of its citizens in antitrust
causes of action. For a general discussion of parens patriae actions, see Avery, Authority of
State to Sue as Parens Patriaeto Recover Treble Damages Under § 4 of Clayton Act,
Annot., 23 A.L.R. Fed. 878 (1975).
47. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 1975) in which the court states:
"Principles of comity, international law and existing United States treaties do not afford
foreign sovereigns the right to press their citizens' claims in a manner barred to domestic
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The following conclusions can be made about the status of foreign
sovereigns under U.S. antitrust law. First, a foreign sovereign is a "person" as a plaintiff but is not a "person" when named as a defendant.
Second, the act of state doctrine and the foreign sovereign compulsion
principle have been recognized as effective defenses in U.S. antitrust law.
Third, in all antitrust actions, the direct purchaser must bring the private
action, and the alleged conduct must be the cause of the injury. Finally,
although states generally may not maintain parens patriae actions
against defendants in an antitrust action, the question whether foreign
sovereigns may bring such suits remains unclear.
III.

A.

INTERACTION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS WITH THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT oF 1976 (FSIA)

Introduction

Prior to the enactment of the FSIA a great deal of confusion surrounded the U.S. position on sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court
initially adopted the absolute theory of sovereign immunity in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon."s Under the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign state may not be sued in the courts of another
nation under any circumstances. In the famous Tate Letter"S issued on
May 19, 1952, the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was endorsed
by the Department of State. Under the restrictive theory, foreign sovereigns are not immune from suit for their private or commercial activities.
The FSIA codified this restrictive theory of immunity. 80 Sovereign immunity is granted by the FSIA in suits involving a foreign state's public acts
(acta jure imperii), but does not extend to suits based upon its commercial or private acts (acta jure gestionis).5 1
states vis-a-vis their citizens."
However, these cases are distinguishable from a class action brought by a state attorney general under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In class action cases the
state does not recover the damages; in a parens patriae action, the state does recover
damages.
48. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). In the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall said:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be
supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him.
49. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprintedin 26 DEP'T ST. BULL.
984 (1952).
50. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 7-8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6606 [hereinafter cited as Housz REPORT].
51. The appropriate sections of the FSIA are quoted below. Immunity of a foreign state
from jurisdiction is covered in section 1604:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is
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The FSIA requires that the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
be, interpreted and applied by the U.S. courts and not by the State Department, thereby providing a consistent procedure for suit against a foreign sovereign.52 The FSIA provides a statutory procedure for making service upon, and obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state."'
No longer is the practice of seizing and attaching the property of a foreign government required for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.8' Finally, there is an attempt to remedy the enforcement problems facing a
plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against a foreign state.65 To fully

a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in.
sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). Exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state are
provided in section 1605:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
which the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with
the terms of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976). Counterclaims are dealt with in section 1607:
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign state intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the foreign state shall not
be accorded immunity with respect to any counterclaim (a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immunity
under section 1605 of this chapter had such claim been brought in a
separate action against the foreign state; or
(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the claim of the foreign state; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state.
28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1976).
52. The declaration of purpose section of the FSIA states:
The Congress finds that the determination by the United States courts of
the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts
.would serve the interests of justice and should protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in the United States courts .... Claims of foreign
states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United
States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this
chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976). See also House REzPORT, supra note 50, at 8.
54. Section 1609 states: "Subject to existing international agreements to which the
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act the property in the United
States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment, arrest and execution except as
provided . .. [by] .

.

. this chapter." 28 U.S.C.

§

1609 (1976).

55. This problem is addressed in 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976): "The property in the United
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understand these provisions and their implications for antitrust law, a
close examination of the statute itself is necessary.'6
B.

The Statutory Provisions of the FSIA

The meaning of three basic phrases in the FSIA are important in
evaluating the impact of the FSIA on U.S. antitrust law. The phrases are:
(1) "foreign state," (2) "commercial activity," and (3) "waiver of immunity." The FSIA's definition of each phrase will be presented, followed by
a look at various court interpretations of the phrases.
The FSIA defines "foreign state" as follows:
A 'foreign state' . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state
or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state .... An agency or

instrumentality of a foreign state means any entity-(1) which is a
separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state

. . . or . . . is owned by a foreign state. . . and
(3) which is neither a citizen of. . .the7 United States ...nor created

under the laws of any third country.5

Any entity which does not fall within these definitions would not be entitled to sovereign immunity.8
This definition of "foreign state" has been broadly construed. in Carey v. National Oil Corp.," a corporation wholly owned by the Libyan
government was a defendant in a contract case. After recognizing the corporation as an agent of Libya, the court dismissed the case finding possible exceptions to immunity inapplicable." However, in Edlow InternaStates of a foreign state ... used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not
be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State ...." (Emphasis added.)
56. At this point the provisions of the FSIA will be addressed to the concerns of this
Comment as much as possible. For additional discussion surrounding the development of
sovereign immunity and the impacts of the 1976 Act, see T.R. GnuTrrAni, THE AmzRICAN LAW
OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1970); Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a
Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. REv. 608 (1954); von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978); Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1 (1976);
Editorial Comment, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 Am. J.
INT'L L. 93 (1953). For a general background, see L. DELUPiS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
INDEPENDENT STATE (1974); L. JAFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 51 (1933); R.
PURNELL, THE SOCIETY OF STATES: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLMcs (1973).

57. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976).
58. On the other hand, the fact that an entity is included in this definition does not
establish an entitlement to sovereign immunity. A court would have to consider whether one
of the specific exceptions to immunity might be applicable and immunity might be denied.
See HousE REPORT, supra note 50, at 15.
59. 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
60. For similar definitions of agency or instrumentality, see Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 396 (D. N.J. 1979); Jet Line Service, Inc. v. m/v Marsa
El Harigan, 462 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1978); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F.
Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978); Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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tional Co. v. Nuklearna Electrarma Krsko, 61 the District Court of the
District of Columbia held that a Yugoslavian nuclear power plant operated by a workers organization was not an "agency or instrumentality of
the state." The court explained:
The Act's legislative history evinces Congress' intent that the definition of 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' be read broadly to
encompass a variety of forms . . . However, there is no suggestion
that a foreign state's system of property ownership, without more,
should be determinative on the question whether an entity operating
within the state is a state agency or instrumentality under the Act."

Thus, what instrumentalities will be found to be "foreign states" ' is unclear. If the defendant is not a foreign state or an agency of the state, it
receives no immunity protection, but if the defendant is a foreign state or
an agency of the state, sovereign immunity is granted subject to the exceptions outlined below.
Potentially the most problematic area of the FSIA lies in its definition of a 'commercial activity.' The FSIA's definition is as follows:
A 'commercial activity' means either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose."
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity rests upon this definition
and the interpretation it has received by the courts.

61. 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977).
62. Id. at 831-32.
63. Compare the class of defendants that may invoke the foreign sovereign immunity
defense as compared to those who may invoke the act of state doctrine or the foreign compulsion principle in antitrust law. Clearly under the latter principle, a broader class of defendants may invoke the compulsion defense since any private defendant may prove that
the violative acts were compelled by a foreign sovereign. The act of state doctrine seems to
rely upon very similar definitions of foreign state. and agency as does the FSIA. However,
the act of state doctrine operates only to preclude issues from consideration, whereas sovereign immunity recognition renders the entire claim nonjusticiable. See National Am. Corp.
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 597 F.2d 314 (1978). See
also DeKieffer, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Antitrust: A Hollow Promise, 7
SmncusS J. ITrr'L L. & Com. 37 (1979).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976). Subsection (e) states: "A 'commercial activity carried on
in the United States by a foreign state' means commercial activity carried on by such state
and having substantial contact with the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (1976). This
"substantial contact" test will not be emphasized further in this Comment. In any antitrust
case, the requirements of the Sherman and Clayton Acts force any potential plaintiff to
comply with a somewhat stricter test than the one required by subsection (e). Therefore, in
order to meet the requirements of a prima facie case, this aspect of the FSIA will not be an
obstacle. If the acts in question are wholly outside U.S. commerce and have no direct effects
in the United States, no antitrust case can be maintained. See East Europe Domestic Int'l
Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 11:81

In OutboardMarine Corp. v. Pezetel," an American manufacturer of
electric golf. carts brought an antitrust action against a Polish manufacturer of identical carts, its wholly owned importer, and the distributors.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that its actions were of a governmental nature and any inquiry into the motives of
the government would result in embarrassment and insult. The court
replied:
(T]he FSIA explicitly instructs that the test in determining whether
the activity is commercial is the nature of that activity and not its
purpose. A review of the activity alleged in the complaint, i.e., involvement in the manufacture and sale of golf carts, admits of only one
conclusion-that defendant Pezetel is engaged in commercial activity
and as such is not immune from suit under the FSIA."
On the other hand, after a rather complete discussion of "commercial
activity," the opposite result was reached in InternationalAssociation of
Machinists v. OPEC. 67 The court stated:
If the activity is one which normally could be engaged in by a private
party, it is a commercial activity and the foreign state is not entitled
to immunity ....

If the activity is one in which only a sovereign can

engage, the activity is noncommercial ...
This Court agrees that this 'commercial activity' should be defined narrowly.. . . From the evidence presented to this Court, it is

clear that the nature of the activity engaged in by each of these OPEC
member countries is the establishment by a sovereign state of the
terms and conditions for the removal of a prime natural resource-to
wit, crude oil-from its territory.68
The decision whether the "commercial activity" definition is to be
narrowly or broadly construed is, as yet, unsettled. A broad construction
of the term by the courts would limit the application of sovereign immunity while a narrow construction of the term probably would lead to increased claims of sovereign immunity.6 ' Clearly, the role of the courts is
critical.
The definition of "waiver of immunity" may also affect antitrust litigation. As a general rule, a waiver of immunity results in no protection
under the FSIA. A prime example of the operation of such a waiver is
65. 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
66. Id. at 395-96. See also United Euram Corp. v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609. (S.D.N.Y.
1978), which held that a contract made with the Soviet Ministry of Culture pursuant to a
cultural exchange agreement with the United States was commercial; and Yessenin-Volpin
v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), which held that a libel suit could

not be brought against Tass because it was an agency of the Soviet government.
67. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).

68. Id. at 566-67.
69. The difficulty in defining the scope of "commercial activity" is also a problem in
applying the act of state doctrine. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682

(1976).
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found in Behring Internationalv. Imperial IranianAir Force.70 Although
not an antitrust action, the waiver concept was determinative. The
Treaty of Amity between the United States and Iran was cited as follows:
No enterprise of either High Contracting Party including corporations, associations, and government agencies and instrumentalities,
which is publicly owned or controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial, shipping or other business activities within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy, either for
itself or for its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other liability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein." (Emphasis added.)
The Court concluded that the waiver of immunity, inter alia, prevented
the Imperial Iranian Air Force from claiming immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
The concept of waiver must be remembered in antitrust law as well.
Since an effective claim of immunity bars any further action by the court,
the possibility that such immunity has been waived would be a crucial
determination.
C.

The Interaction-Between the FSIA and Antitrust Law

It should be clear from the above that there is an interrelationship
between antitrust law and the concept of foreign sovereign immunity.
When a court is presented with an antitrust claim involving a foreign sovereign as a defendant, dismissal of the case may be based upon many
factors. The court may, potentially, lack jurisdiction through the operation of the PSIA. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which
must be specifically pleaded, and the burden of its proof is on the foreign
state. 72 Assessment of whether the defendant is a "foreign state" or an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," along with the critical determination of whether the alleged violative act is a "commercial activity," must be made by the court. Finally, the court must investigate
whether a waiver has occurred.
Only after these determinations are made may the court deal with
the procedural problems of antitrust law. Aside from the basic definition
of a "person" which may be a complete defense for a foreign sovereign as
a defendant, 7' numerous other factors must be considered. The court may
70. 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979).
71. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United
States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, art. XI, pare. 4, T.I.A.S. No. 3853.
72. House REPORT, supra note 50, at 17. For further discussion of the FSIA, see Friend,
Suing a Foreign Government Under the United States Antitrust Laws: The Need for Clarification of the Commercial Activity Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 1 Nw. J. Ibr'L L. & Bus. 657 (1979).
73. An interesting question is whether a counterclaim made against a foreign sovereign
in an antitrust action would fail. Although immunity is generally waived by a sovereign
plaintiff, an antitrust counterclaim would fail if the sovereign plaintiff was not recognized as
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choose not to pursue a cause of action because of the act of state doctrine,
since to do so would involve a judgment concerning acts of a government
within that government's own borders, or because the named defendant's
acts were compelled by a foreign sovereign. Also, the court must address
the plaintiff's cause of action to determine if the plaintiff was the direct
purchaser and if there was a substantial causal connection between the
alleged harm and any actions of the defendants. In the case of a sovereign
plaintiff, the harm must be to the sovereign itself and cannot appear to
be an action in parens patriae.
Although these procedures seem relatively basic, courts are often unwilling to realize the distinctions and the interactions between sovereign
immunity and antitrust law. At most the courts only implicitly recognize
the above-mentioned distinctions. Clearly, numerous obstacles exist to
the maintenance of a successful antitrust action against a foreign
sovereign.
On the other hand, there are no corresponding procedural obstacles if
a foreign sovereign brings a suit as a private plaintiff. It is possible that a
foreign state could take full advantage of U.S. antitrust remedies such as
treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs, and yet remain totally invulnerable to any related counterclaim because it is not recognized as a "person" under antitrust law. This favorable position enjoyed by foreign sovereigns has resulted in congressional concern, and legislative changes
intended to allow more consistent application of the antitrust laws have
been proposed.7 ' The remainder of this Comment will focus upon the proposed legislation and the reasons behind these proposals.
IV.

A.

LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES

Introduction

The proposed legislation focuses upon the foreign sovereign as a private plaintiff rather than as a defendant. Presently it is improbable, if not
impossible, to maintain an antitrust action against a foreign sovereign or
an agency thereof.75 Also, any legislative solution is limited by internaa "person" against whom a counterclaim could be filed since the sovereign's position would
be analogous to a defendant for purposes of the counterclaim.
74. Perhaps the legislators, as well as this author, are guilty of the attempt to make all
court opinions fit into one picture. As Judge Wyzanski warned: "[I]n connection with the
Sherman Act, it is delusive to treat opinions written by different judges at different times as
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle which can be, by effort, fitted correctly into a single pattern."
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). However, statutory law is based upon a concept of notice. It
can be argued easily that if court interpretation has grown too muddled or is contrary to the
intentions of Congress when a particular statute was passed, there should be some congressional action to clarify, distinguish, or overrule such judicial interpretation.
75. Since a foreign state has been held not to be a person under the antitrust laws when
it is a defendant, it may be impossible to maintain such an action. Besides this factor, the
other considerations discussed above, such as sovereign immunity, make the likelihood of a
successful suit very remote.
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tional reality. The existence of cartels is an international fact, and it is
foreign sovereigns to
highly doubtful that any national attempt to force
7
comply with U.S. antitrust laws could succeed.
On the other hand, congressional action could be effective against a
foreign state plaintiff since they voluntarily enter our courts. Thus, given
international political realities and the inequities of the current status of
the foreign sovereign under U.S. antitrust law, the potential for an effective legislative proposal is limited to regulating the potential foreign
plaintiff.
B.

The Major Concerns

Among the issues any legislative proposal should address are those of
international boycotts and the defense of in pari delicto. The growing
involvement of foreign governments in transnational commerce, together
with their established rights to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act,
pose a number of novel issues where the alleged boycott is related to actual or threatened coercion by a potential plaintiff government.
For example, consider an extension of the fact situation present in
Long Island Lighting v. Standard Oil Co. of California.1"In that case,
various public utilities brought antitrust actions against three integrated
petroleum companies alleging that these companies engaged in group
boycott activity and attempts to monopolize. In dismissing the boycott
claim, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
holding that the utilities were not in the "target area" and, therefore,
lacked standing. The group boycott was aimed primarily at Libya and
secondarily at Saudi Arabia. Assume for the moment that this case had

76. Even U.S. allies, when they become specially involved, question many Justice Department antitrust enforcement activities. However, a few of them, West Germany for example, have agreed to aid in antitrust investigations and proceedings, including discovery
and judgment enforcement. See Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-Fed. Republic of Germany, 27
U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291, which specifically provides for cooperation between the two
countries in antitrust enforcement proceedings.
However, many allies have become determined to limit U.S. interference in their economies and feel that American courts have attempted to reach out too far under the antitrust
laws. The French have recently passed a bill, commonly referred to as a "blocking statute,"
that makes it a crime for persons to hand over business records subpoenaed in foreign antitrust proceedings. [July-Dec.) ATrMRUsT AND TRAE REo. Rzip. (BNA) No. 993, at A-7 (Dec.
11, 1980). Retaliatory blocking statutes to prevent legal discovery in antitrust proceedings
have been adopted or are being considered by a number of foreign governments. Other alternatives being used include: nonenforceability statutes which make a foreign firm, in effect, judgment-proof; and "clawback" laws, which allow the foreign state to recover part or
all of the treble damages awarded under U.S. laws. Besides France, countries having or developing such laws include Great Britain, Canada, Australia and .New Zealand. Id. See also
British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1952) 2 All E.R. 780, 784

(C.A.).
77. 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1975).
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occurred after Pfizer,78 and Libya and Saudi Arabia had attacked this
boycott in American courts seeking treble damages and costs. Theoretically, they would be treated the same as any private plaintiff and a prima
facie case, including the effect on U.S. commerce, could easily be stated.
Even if the boycott was in response to the formation of a cartel between Libya and Saudia Arabia, it is likely that the in pari delicto defense would fail. In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp.,79 this defense was apparently abolished. The court in Perma Life
stated: "The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no
less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his
suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition.""
Thus, while the in pari delicto defense seems to be the only existing protection against the inequitable use of the court system, serious doubts
exist as to whether any form of the defense has survived.8 1
Another concern is that the foreign state is receiving better treatment in the American courts than the United States itself. As stated
above, the United States can only recover actual damages as a plaintiff in
an antitrust action along with the cost of the suit."2 As the law now
stands, a foreign government may seek treble damages and attorney's
fees, in addition to court costs. Furthermore, since foreign nations tend to
"tag along" on major Justice Department antitrust cases rather than institute the initial suit themselves, single damages should be a sufficient
incentive to prosecute the claim. 8 When combined together, the inequalities are of greater concern. The highly developed nature and relative ease
of access to U.S. courts dilutes whatever incentive may exist for foreign
78. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
79. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
80. Id. at 139.
81. See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 688-89 (9th Cir.
1976). Consider the statement made by Houser & Rigler in Antitrust and the Foreign Government Trader: The Impact of Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 10 LAW & PoL'y INT'L Bus.
719, 758-59 (1978):
If there is at least a wheezy breath remaining in some form of in pari delicto
in a domestic context, there should be a species of it applicable to cases arising
out of foreign government coercive practices ....

[Tihe defendant should

have to show that its conduct arose out of and was intended to mitigate the
effect of actual or imminently threatened conduct by the plaintiff that would
expose the defendant to serious economic harm, and that the defendant had
exhausted all other reasonable avenues of relief from the impact of the foreign
government's action. Such a formulation of the in pari delicto defense recognizes that no public goal is advanced by permitting recovery when the defendant's allegedly illegal act was precipitated by the plaintiffs application of coercive economic power.
Judicial recognition of this view of the in pari dilecto defense has yet to occur. An
alternative would be to require that the foreign sovereign plaintiff pursue the claim in its
own courts under their own antitrust provisions.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976). See also note 11 supra.
83. See Gaertner, Foreign Nation Suits for Treble Damages Under the Clayton Act
After Pfizer v. Government of India, 13 U. MicH. J.L. REP. 405, 421 (1980).
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nations to develop further their own antitrust laws. Frequently, foreign
nations are unable to pursue their antitrust claims in their own court
systems.
The above represents some of the concerns voiced by various members of Congress when drafting the new proposals. The proposed legislation focuses on three alternative solutions: (1) limiting the foreign state to
single damages, (2) requiring general reciprocity, and (3) pursuing a more
complete overall investigation in the hopes of achieving a more complete
solution. Limiting the foreign state to single damages would put it on
equal footing with the United States. General reciprocity would require
foreign nations to prohibit behavior violative of U.S. antitrust law if they
wish to sue because of such behavior in American courts, thus providing
additional international antitrust development and allowing the United
States to more effectively pursue claims against foreign firms.'" Finally,
an investigatory commission would be able to examine the concerns of the
courts, the agencies involved, the foreign nations, and the commentators
to achieve an overall consistent solution.
Historically, Congress has not been concerned with international antitrust. Since the enactment of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 5 Congress has
not passed any antitrust legislation intended to solve international
problems. However, the inconsistency and confusion in judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws in an international context have resulted in a
new wave of legislative proposals.
C. Actual Legislative Proposals
Senator Strom Thurmond introduced a bill to amend section 4 of the
Clayton Act to expressly exclude a foreign sovereign from the meaning of
the word "person." 6 The foreign sovereign is not left without redress,
however, since it may sue and single damages are to be allowed. 1 Senator
Thurmond stated: "It appears to me that it is only fair and that common
sense will lead us to treat a foreign nation no better or no worse than we
treat our own country in U.S. courts.""a
Senator Daniel Inouye proposed a bill to allow treble damage recov84. Id. at 422-29.
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976). The Webb-Pomerene Act allows some avoidance of the
antitrust laws. When an association is formed for the sole purpose of engaging in export
trade, then any agreement made or act done by the association is deemed not to be a restraint of trade, provided the act done or agreement made has no effect on prices in the

United States. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976). For excellent discussions of the Act, see Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1

(1974); McDermid, The Antitrust Commission and the Webb-Pomerene Act: A Critical Assessment, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 105 (1980); Rahi, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNULL INT'L L.J. 1 (1974).

86. S.2395, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
87. This bill would allow for treatment identical to that received by the United States
itself. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. at 162.

88. 124 CONG. REc. S 36, 36 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1978).
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ery if there was strict reciprocity between the United States and the foreign nation desiring to use the American courts. His bill would amend
section 4 of the Clayton Act by adding: "A foreign government, including
any agency or agent thereof, may sue for any injury pursuant to this section if United States persons and the United States government are permitted equivalent access and relief for the same injury in the courts of
such foreign sovereign government."' 9 Congressman Charles Wiggins introduced the most drastic proposal. His proposal would exclude foreign
sovereigns from the protection of American antitrust law altogether.90
None of these proposals is entirely effective in achieving the desired
end. It is relatively easy to rewrite the Clayton Act to provide for single
damages rather than treble damages, but while the Thurmond proposal
places the foreign sovereign on equal footing with the United States, it
does not address the concerns about the formation of cartels nor does it
recognize that antitrust law is saddling U.S. firms with an additional
nontariff barrier. On the other hand, the Inouye bill, which attempts to
deal with these concerns by requiring complete reciprocity, would effectively eliminate the development of foreign antitrust law. Furthermore,
no foreign court system could reflect the development of U.S. antitrust
law in a short period of time.
To date, the most acceptable proposal has been offered by Senator
Dennis DeConcini..His proposal incorporates an actual damages requirement together with a reciprocity requirement. His proposed amendment
to section 4 of the Clayton Act would require that before a foreign sovereign may maintain an action in a U.S. court, the Attorney General must
certify to the relevant court that the United States is entitled to sue in its
own name and on its own behalf in the courts of the foreign sovereign,
and that the foreign sovereign has laws that prohibit restrictive trade
practices. 1
This amendment establishes both single damages and the mechanics
for the development of antitrust reciprocity. However, the requirement of
a determination by the Attorney General as to the reciprocity issue not
only places an additional burden upon the Attorney General's office but
also places the reciprocity determination in a potentially political atmosphere. Such a determination by the executive branch would inevitably
involve political considerations apart from the actual congressional intention to make .the application of antitrust laws to foreign sovereigns more
equitable.
There has been one additional legislative attempt that, in the long
run, may avoid many of the problems found in the previous proposals.
89. S. 2724, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978), reprinted in Gaertner, supra note 83, at 431.
90. H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).

91. S. 2486, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978). See Gaertner, supra note 83, at 430. This was
the only proposal to be reintroduced in the 96th and the 97th Congresses. At the time of
this writing, S. 816, the version of the bill introduced into the 97th Congress, had already
been reported out of subcommittee with approval. S. 816, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981).
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The bill, S. 1010, proposed to establish a Commission on the International Application of the United States Antitrust Laws." The Senate
passed the bill but no corresponding House bill was approved. Basically,
the bill established a commission that would examine the impact of the
antitrust laws on the ability of U.S. firms to compete effectively in overseas markets, along with an examination of how these laws interrelate
with those of other nations. Specifically, section two of the proposal provided that the study shall specifically address the proper scope and effect
of the following on the application of U.S' antitrust laws: The rules governing sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion, and the doctrine of comity." s
Most importantly, the Commission would assemble the ideas of the
important commentators and government agencies involved in international antitrust problems. Then, the recommended changes in U.S. antitrust law would be presented to the President and to Congress. Conceivably, such recommendations could deal effectively with the abovediscussed concerns. However, as with any commission formed for the purposes of study and recommendation, delay and confusion could well
result.
V.

CONCLUSION

To focus on the status of foreign sovereigns and their interaction
with American antitrust law is to focus on the tip of the iceberg of extraterritorial antitrust application. However, that focus reveals the basic differences in economic philosophy between the United States and the rest
of the world. No other country has the developed antitrust policies nor an
economic philosophy as predominately built upon the promotion of free
enterprise as has the United States. In fact, many nations ignore the entire antitrust concept. Requiring these nations to appear in a U.S. court
to defend against activity violative of U.S. laws could easily lead to international embarrassment. The OPEC nations, for example, would discount
charges of price fixing and cartelization since these are the basic functions
of the OPEC cartel. The United States must recognize the fact that much
of the world disagrees, fundamentally, with the entire antitrust concept.
However, developed antitrust law is critical to the survival of the American economic system. Given that modern business is conducted across national boundaries, U.S. antitrust law must retain an international flexibility. The law, as it presently exists, is not applied consistently in an
international context.
Consider the plight of American corporations involved in business relationships with organizations of nations. They cannot band together to
offset sovereign group activity in the international marketplace since any
concerted American activity would, in all probability, violate U.S. anti92. S. 1010, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1979).
93. Id. § 2.
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trust provisions. If they do violate the law, they face private treble damage actions instigated by the very force they desired to offset." To make
matters worse, if the American corporation becomes involved in private
litigation as a defendant, the defense of in pari delicto is not available
against the foreign sovereign.
If American corporations seek to use the antitrust provisions as a response to international group pressure, the result is similarly futile. A foreign state, first of all, is immune from suit unless involved in commercial
activity in the United States. As shown above, much of this determination relies upon the definition of commercial activity, which has been defined broadly by some courts and narrowly by others. Yet, if it is decided
that the activity is not protected by the FSIA, additional antitrust barriers must be overcome. The foreign nation may not be recognized as a
"person" subject to U.S. antitrust law. Even assuming the elimination of
that barrier, the act of state doctrine and the foreign sovereign compulsion principle almost assure a complete defense for the foreign sovereign
involved.
The courts have neither the means nor the authority to clarify the
issues. To pass hurried legislation is hardly a better alternative. As has
been pointed out, the current legislative alternatives have not attempted
to grasp the entire problem. For example, the inclusion of conditions of
reciprocity, although logically sound, requires an investigation which
makes the proposal not feasible in an international setting. In addition,
many of these concepts of reciprocal treatment would eliminate altogether the needed growth in antitrust law.
It is doubtful whether an international agreement could effectively
deal with monopolistic activity. Any agreement among nations would necessarily be voluntary in nature.'0 Antitrust laws affect the foundation of a
nation's economic system. States that thrive upon government controlled
group activity and price fixing cartelization are not going to ratify an
agreement that may jeopardize their economic future. The solution lies in
domestic legislation passed after a thorough investigation. The desire to
94. See Hearings on InternationalAspects of Antitrust Laws, Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1416-37
(1973). Seventy percent of the firms responding to a questionnaire prepared by the National
Association of Manufacturers indicated their belief that U.S. antitrust laws had impaired
their ability to compete in international markets. Their concerns included the inability to
respond to challenges from foreign cartels, intergovernmental friction over antitrust enforcement and uncertainty about the scope of antitrust laws as applied to foreign trade.
95. The United Nations has served as the catalyst for many such attempts, and, on

December 5, 1980, the U.N. General Assembly adopted The Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, G.A. Res.
35/63, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/63 (1980). These guidelines govern the restrictive business prac-

tices of states and transnational corporations, but not restrictive business practices which
are the direct result of agreements between governments. See Development, Antitrust Law:
United Nations Guidelines, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 405, 406 (1981). Also, the guidelines are not
binding. Id. at 410.
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quickly correct the recognized problems should not lead to poorly conceived solutions which would only substitute inconsistencies and
problems for those that presently exist. While the areas in need of investigation and reformulation can be readily determined, the problems are
not so easily solved.
The foreign nation's position as plaintiff must be reassessed. What is
the reasoning behind granting the foreign sovereign treble damages while
the United States is limited to single damages? The purpose of the treble
damage provision was to motivate the private plaintiff to pursue antitrust
violations. However, when foreign governments are involved, even assuming the lack of action by the Justice Department, the defenses available
to a foreign sovereign are hardly comparable to those available to the individual private plaintiff. In fact, the need for a foreign state to enforce
the U.S. antitrust law against American firms is questionable. Yet, many
of the arguments for the "single damages" limitation are just as easily
applied to the American states. More severe problems surface when the
foreign sovereign is in the position of the defendant. The vagueness of the
"commercial activity" exception to the FSIA must be recognized. It is the
interpretation of the particular court involved that becomescritical. Some
guidelines must be established.
With respect to antitrust law, the dictates of the statutory provisions
must lead to consistent interpretation regardless of international limitations. Although it must be recognized that there are acts of foreign states
which will be immune from antitrust prosecution, no nation should be
able to avoid an antitrust counterclaim if it seeks to challenge the activities of U.S. firms. In order to realize this goal, first of all, definitional and
procedural issues must be resolved including the definition of a "person."
Second, the in pari delicto defense must be revived.
Past legislative proposals are headed in the proper direction. They
have a consistent common goal which is to place the foreign sovereign on
an equal footing with the U.S. government. Amending the Clayton Act to
provide single damages for foreign states is directed to this end as is the
promotion of antitrust protections around the world by requiring reciprocity. If reciprocity could be achieved, the U.S. government as well as
U.S. corporations could pursue complaints of unfair trade practices
abroad. However, the current legislative proposals require that the reciprocity determination be made by the Justice Department. One must
question the practical consequences of such a determination since access
may be denied a foreign state on a political, rather than a legal basis.
Additionally, an expansion of the Webb-Pomerene exception may be
needed to remedy some inequalities relating to nations that have no desire to develop any antitrust law because of their legal and economic
systems.
This entire discussion leads to one conclusion: The policy of antitrust
application to foreign nations must be investigated and defined. A commission to investigate the total picture can only contribute to an increased sense of direction in this area. The courts have been pursuing .the
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development of an international antitrust policy without the benefit of
overall issue clarification. The shortcomings of case-by-case decision making have become readily apparent. Clarification of the issues by a complete legislative investigation can only lead to more consistent results.

